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

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VIETNAM

By Jack Grancharoff

Vietnam is a country where freedom is expensive but blood is cheap. A country where ideologies are striving for supremacy and domination, each in the name of the people, for the people. But ideologies may be both lofty and deceptive. Here their essential nature is to obscure the real issue, to distort vision and pervert conscience. In other words, to make of man a blind, docile follower who lacks independent judgement, who is a regimented unit. In the face of the slogans of "civilised" nations — "free world", "peaceful coexistence", etc. — the struggle is violent and uncivilised.

In South Vietnam a United States-style democracy is in operation. There American troops are fighting in defence, they are told, of democracy, trying to prevent the "communist hordes" taking over the republic of South Vietnam. And with the United States forces are their faithful satellites, New Zealand and Australia. In Australia the functional democracy led to conscription — a "democratic expression". But forgive those who have not a will of their own, whose fidelity to the whims of the master is beyond doubt.

Is the emotional outburst of the American paladins, who proclaim themselves champions of freedom and democracy, genuine? Is their moral assumption to protect the South Vietnamese people honest? Do they really value the life of the people? Hypocrisy and double values are basic factors of U.S. policy, and of any policy which is interested in preserving the State machinery, privileges and exploitation. We can see the face of the ugly American everywhere. We need only mention Dominica, Guatemala, Cuba, and now Vietnam. But let the Americans talk for themselves.

In 1945 the French troops in Indo-China rebelled against the Japanese. The Japanese counter-attacked with full-scale operation. The French, in a hopeless situation, sought help from the U.S. The American Air Force operating in that theatre ignored the French appeal for help. Here are the words of General Chemnault, commander of the 14th U.S. Force (*Way of a fighter*, p. 342):

". . . General Wedemeyer's orders not to aid the French came directly from the War Department. Apparently it was American policy then that French Indo-China would not be returned to the French. The American government was interested in seeing the French forcibly

ejected from Indo-China so the problem of post-war separation from their colony would be easier . . . While American transports in China avoided Indo-China, the British flew aerial supply missions for the French all the way from Calcutta, dropping tommy guns, grenades and mortars."

How can one explain this U.S. behaviour? Because of their lofty ideals? The loftiness of the ideal can be seen by the Eisenhower Seattle speech of August 4, 1953: "Let us assume we lose Indo-China . . . The peninsula, the last bit of land hanging on down there, would be scarcely defensible. The tin and tungsten that we value so greatly from that area would cease coming . . ." But there are more than tin and tungsten; there are rubber, cobalt, manganese, uranium, etc. There is not much loftiness in the speech, 17th February, 1964, of Sen. Gale McGee, who at least is straightforward: "The empire in South-East Asia is the last large resource area outside the control of any one of the major powers . . . I believe that the conditions of the Vietnamese people and the direction in which their future may be going at this stage are secondary . . ."

And the U.N. Charter of individual freedom and national self-determination? A charter to which the U.S. subscribes, These beautifully worded sentences are meaningless in the struggle for power, domination, exploitation. Where the Vietminh organized assassination of the opposition party leaders, religious sects and Trotskyists, the U.S. was silent because their interests dictated otherwise. If the interests change as was the case after the Geneva conference then the democratic procedure is suspended. Self-determination, free elections are not necessary if they do not coincide with the interests of the master nation, in this case the United States.

What about the communist parties? What was the French Communist Party doing when the Vietnamese people were fighting for their liberation? The following is from "Solidarity" pamphlet No. 20:

"Communist Party members today will often deny that the French Party ever voted the war credits for the Indo-China war. Sometimes they will even imply that the fighting in Indo-China only started in 1947, after the Communist Party had been expelled from the French government. Here is the chapter and verse to nail this lie.

"In September, 1945, the French government, in which the Communists held several ministries, demanded 193 milliard francs of military credits, of which 100 milliard were specifically designated to set up the Expeditionary Corps. The Party voted for this measure.

"In January, 1946, on the occasion of the annual budget vote, the socialist deputies asked for a 20% reduction of military credits. Charles Tillon, Communist Minister for Armaments, opposed the demand, and the Communist deputies ensured that it was rejected.

"On July 26, 1946, a budget of 189 milliard francs was approved by the Communist deputies. On the same day the Assembly adopted with the support a constitutional definition of the 'French Union'.

"On October 3, 1946, the Communist deputies voted to approve the final 1946 budget which included the military budget.

"On December 20, 1946, a whole month after the murderous bombardment of Haiphong, the 182 Communist deputies voted unanimously, together with the rest of the Chamber, to send congratulations to General Leclerc and to his Expeditionary Corps!

"On December 23, 1946, the Communist deputies voted the provisional 1947 budget, which included 70 milliards in military credits required 'because of the resumption of hostilities in Indo-China'."

Briefly it can be argued that neither East nor West is interested in the liberation of Vietnam. Communists and capitalists are interested in Vietnam to see that the struggle of the Vietnamese people does not clash with their interests. Both power blocs are manoeuvring the Vietnamese people for purposes which have nothing to do with real liberation or emancipation.

It is ridiculous and cruel to think that U.S. forces or, for that matter, their allies, whose victims are the Vietnamese people, are there to promote democracy. They are there to win a war. A "dirty war" as some newspapers have called it; was there ever a clean war? The presence of the U.S. forces in Vietnam is dictated by interest, not because of democratic feelings or love of the people, or freedom. What kind of freedom or love is this which in the name of the people decimates it, turns the country into a cemetery, and ploclaims the silence a triumph of democracy?

Even so there is no free course left for the Vietnamese people. It is time for the U.S. to withdraw its troops and let the Vietnamese decide their own destiny. It does not need the presence of American or Chinese in Vietnam to teach the Vietnamese the right way of thinking.

Who loses in Vietnam? Not the Chinese or Americans — but always the People!

PLURALISM AND ANARCHISM

Kenneth Maddock

A common objection to anarchist proposals is that they postulate society without the State, that is, anarchy in one of the two literal senses of the word. But men, it is objected, need to be governed. Such criticism may take a naive form, as when it is implied that but for the government we would all be murdered in our beds. We are to believe that it was to escape this fate that the citizens assembled and appointed some of their number to rule the rest, thus instituting the State.

But criticism of the anarchist postulate may take a sophisticated form, as in the writings of the Italian conservative, Gaetano Mosca. Mosca's general theme, which he shares with a group of writers who sometimes go under the collective label of "Machiavellians", is the perennial domination of majorities by minorities. Ruling minorities may come and go (Pareto: "History is a graveyard of aristocracies"), but always there are ruling minorities. This permanent feature of society is obscured, but not altered, by ideological slogans, such as "government by the people" and "majority rule". Anarchism is powerless to abrogate this social law. In Mosca's words:

> "But suppose we assume that the anarchist hypothesis has come about in the fact, that the present type of social organization has been destroyed, that nations and governments have ceased to exist, and that standing armies, bureaucrats, parliaments and especially policeman and jails have been swept away. Unfortunately people would still have to live, and therefore use the land and other instruments of production. Unfortunately again, arms and weapons would still be there, and enterprising, courageous characters would be ready to use them in order to make others their servants or slaves. Given those elements, little social groups would at once form, and in them the many would toil while the few, armed and organized, would either be robbing them or protecting them from other robbers, but living on their toil in any event. In other words, we should be going back to the simple, primitive type of social organization in which each group of armed men is absolute master of some plot of ground and of those who cultivate it, so long as the group can conquer the plot of ground and hold it with its own strength" (*The Ruling Class*, 1939, p. 295).

Some of the writers advancing this general type of criticism, while calling into question the soundness of anarchist theories, manage to pay

the anarchists what looks like a compliment. Thus, Robert Michels speaks of anarchism as "a movement on behalf of liberty, founded on the inalienable right of the human being over his own person" (*Political parties*, 1915, p. 360). George Molnar speaks of anarchism as "the only radical movement whose principal avowed concern was with freedom" (Libertarian Society's *Broadsheet*, No. 30).

Now in examining the issues we must distinguish two notions, which it has been usual to confuse. We must separate the concept of *anarchy*, meaning society without the State, from the concept of *free society*, meaning society in which no group has any of its activities subjected to authority or coercion.

Resort to coercion and appeal to authority are standard means of trying to compel a person or group to conform to a course of action supported by the person or group resorting to coercion or appealing to authority. A coercive person or group uses or threatens violence in the attempt to compel conformity. An authoritarian person or group appeals to some authority, which is represented as requiring the course of action demanded by the authoritarian. The notion of sacredness is commonly annexed to authorities: their requirements are represented as being obligatory and their credentials as above inquiry. Authorities are of the most diverse kind. They may be definite, as when appeal is made to rights conferred by legal status or legal contract. They may be indefinite, as when appeal is made to the requirements of God or Freedom or National Interest or Working-Class Solidarity.

Appeals to authority are commonly made when the authoritarian is unable or unwilling to resort to coercion. His aim is to put you in a position where, if you do not comply with his demands, you will feel ill at ease with yourself, will feel guilty. His aim may also be to excite public animosity against you.

An inquiry into freedom in society can thus be rephrased as an inquiry into the operation of authority and coercion in society. An activity is free if not subjected to authoritarian or coercive restrictions. But an activitiy that is free in this sense may be repressive, that is, may be aimed at imposing authoritarian or coercive restrictions on others. Activities, therefore, may be assigned to one or other of four types: free and unrepressive, free and repressive, unfree and unrepressive, unfree and repressive. Scientific inquirers, brigands in *de facto* control of a region, domestic slaves and non-commissioned officers in the army might be taken, at least in certain circumstances, as respective examples of men involved in the four types of activity.

But in attending concretely to this or that social group, this or that social activity, this or that social interest, we must keep in mind the

complexity of things. Coercive and authoritarian demands may be ineffectual, if not in the short then in the long term. Consider, for example, the attacks made by churchmen at various times on scientific inquiry, on "immorality" and, to take a current example, on government policy in Vietnam. The history of legislative attempts to repress drinking, adultery, robbery with violence and industrial strikes supports the same conclusion.

II

We are now in a position to continue the inquiry, in particular to ask whether anarchist social organization is, in fact, impracticable, as Mosca asserts, and whether the anarchists are really the party of freedom. The only sound approach is through the study of existent anarchies.

To the question, "Have there been anarchies?", that is, societies without the State, an affirmative answer can be given. Anarchies are, or have been, common in Africa, North America, Melanesia, Australia and other parts of the world, in societies with primitive or peasant economies. Conquest and rule by outsiders has modified the political structures of these societies: either drastically, as when headmen, native chiefs, village councils and the like, endowed with coercive authority, have been created by the rulers; or superficially, as when a colonial administration, staffed only by outsiders, is superimposed on the indigenous anarchy.

The point about these societies is that they are free from governmental institutions, that is, there is no one group within them claiming and exercising authority to regulate the activities of all other groups, claiming and exercising monopoly on the use of violence in society. Yet in these societies disputes arise over marriages, land, movable property, ritual prerogatives and so on, and disputes are settled (sometimes) despite the political anarchy. In the course of the disputes the parties promote their conflicting demands by resort to coercion and appeal to authority. (For a study of the operation of these processes in a Stateless society, see L. R. Hiatt, *Kinship and Conflict*, 1965.) Several conclusions can be drawn from the primitive anarchies.

First, they show that anarchy is a workable political order. Mosca denied that, holding that a "successful" anarchist revolution would result in a reversion of society to what he took to be the "primitive type of social organization", a multiplicity of petty Statelets tyrannized over by armed gangs. But the primitive anarchies known to us through anthropological inquiry are genuinely Stateless. Whether a Stateless society can be created by abolition of the State where it already exists is a separate question, and anthropology gives no answer to it.

Secondly, the primitive anarchies show that authority and coercion are processes independent of the State, which must be regarded as a particular social form through which they operate. Abolition of the State must, therefore, be distinguished from abolition of authority and coercion. Generalization about "quantities" of authority and coercion in Stateless, as opposed to State, societies, is impossible; at most sexual freedom in a particular society of one type could be contrasted with sexual freedom in a particular society of the other type, and similarly with other kinds of freedom.

Thirdly, the primitive anarchies show that anarchy, as a political order, is independent of general acceptance of some monolithic principle of behaviour, contrary to what some critics have asserted. This kind of assertion was advanced by George Orwell, for example, in his essay on Swift:

> "This illustrates very well the totalitarian tendency which is explicit in the anarchist or pacifist vision of Society. In a Society in which there is no law, and in theory no compulsion, the only arbiter of behaviour is public opinion. But public opinion, because of the tremendous urge to conformity in gregarious animals, is less tolerant than any system of law, when human beings are governed by 'thou shalt not', the individual can practise a certain amount of eccentricity: when they are supposedly governed by 'love' or 'reason', he is under continuous pressure to make him behave and think in exactly the same way as everyone else" (*Shooting an Elephant and Other Essays*, 1950, pp. 71-72).

Fourthly, the anthropoligical evidence shows an association of political anarchy with simple economies, economies of the type we would call primitive or peasant. In these societies production is characteristically by small groups, whose members are often kin to each other. Such a group produces for its own needs, obtaining what it is unable or unwilling to produce by direct exchange with other groups of the same general type. A society with such a simple economy is admirably adapted to political anarchy, though not all societies with simple economies are anarchic. What would State authority give to these societies? Sometimes military protection, sometimes participation in a far more complex economy. But benefits are secured at a price: military protection is usually from other States, through taxation the State, in effect, compels its subjects to labour without pay, and State authority sanctions the co-existence of great wealth and great poverty. A State, one may say, has a vested interest in its subjects. The image of the shepherd and his flock is to the point, for what does a shepherd with his sheep if not fleece and devour them?

Now it can be objected that these societies, though anarchies, were unconsciously anarchist. Can anarchist movements institute anarchy where the State already exists? Anarchists would answer in the affirmative, pointing to the experience of Spain during the civil war. Their belief finds some confirmation in accounts given by eye-witnesses who were not of the anarchist persuasion, notably Orwell, Gerald Brenan, Franz Borkenau.

The parts of Spain where anarchism was seen at its most impressive, from the point of view of actually instituting some sort of anarchy, were peasant districts which had long been impregnated with propaganda. To introduce anarchy all that had to be done was to drive out the representatives of the State. The basically anarchist peasant organization would then operate free from State-imposed restrictions. The special circumstances of the civil war gave the anarchists the opportunity of doing this, and an agrarian anarchism persisted in parts until the final victory of the fascist forces. Borkenau's account of the Spanish worker and peasant, the man who proved himself such good anarchist material, is worth inspection. He argues that Bakuninist theories, when introduced in Spain during the closing decades of the nineteenth century, found conditions to which they were peculiarly appropriate, conditions which had existed since the eighteenth century. Notable among these were the great economic and cultural gap between upper and lower classes, the peasant propensity to violence and brigandage, the hostility to "progress", especially "progress" in the form of capitalist enterprise, and the degeneration of the Catholic Church. The latter condition contributed to the anarchist movement becoming imbued with moral and religious fervour. Borkenau gives this vignette of the Spaniard:

> "There is a profound difference, in the view of a primitive peasantry, between the man who breaks the solidarity of the peasant community itself by criminal acts and the man who, in seeking his own right against the rich and mighty by brigandage and murder, helps the common cause of the oppressed. The former, the thief or the murderer who has killed or robbed a peasant, would be unhesistatingly delivered to the police or given short shrift by those he had damaged. The latter will be protected by the poor, throughout his district . . . The average Spanish peasant, would be unhesitatingly delivered to the police or given life and property characteristic of the well-policed countries of the West" (*The Spanish Cockpit*, 1963 ed., p. 15).

The anarchism which developed among such men was compatible with the exercise of authority and coercion, processes without which no large-scale social reconstruction could be effected. This should occasion no surprise, since the example of the primitive anarchies shows

that authority and coercion are not to be identified exclusively with the State. What the Spanish anarchists aimed at was the abolition of the State and certain forms of activity upheld by State power (lawyer, moneylender, landlord, for example), which entailed driving out, and keeping out, representatives of the State, and instituting new social arrangements. The resort to coercion and appeal to authority implied in this would have been inconsistent with anarchy only if serving to create new groups which, masked by no-State slogans, claimed and exercised authority and power over all other groups. When this is kept in mind a new construction can be placed on the authoritarianism attributed to some of the leading anarchists, notably Bakunin, which need no longer necessarily be construed as aberrations.

To advert to the distinction between anarchy and free society: in the primitive world there is anarchy, but not free society, and in Spain anarchy was instituted, but not free society. It would be naive to expect authority and coercion to be abolished in civil war conditions, but in any case anarchy does not require their abolition. At the same time, it must be admitted that anarchists have often spoken as if what they wanted was the abolition of authority and coercion in all forms. Take Kropotkin in his *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article, for example:

> ". . . harmony in such a society being obtained, not by submission to law or by obedience to any authority, but by free agreements concluded between the various groups, territorial and professional, freely constituted for the sake of production and consumption, as also for the satisfaction of the infinite variety of needs and aspirations of a civilized being. In a society developed on these lines, the voluntary associations . . . would . . . substitute themselves for the State in all its functions.
>
> "They would represent an interwoven network, composed of an infinite variety of groups and federations of all sizes and degrees . . . for all possible purposes . . . and . . . for the satisfaction of an ever-increasing number of scientific, artistic, literary and social needs. Moreover, such a society would represent nothing immutable. On the contrary . . . harmony would (it is contended) result from an ever-changing adjustment and readjustment of equilibrium between the multitude of forces and influences, and this adjustment would be the easier to obtain as none of the forces would enjoy a special protection from the State.
>
> "If . . . society were organized on these principles, man would not be limited in the free exercise of his powers in productive work by a capitalist monopoly, maintained by the State; nor would he be limited in the exercise of his will by a fear of punishment, or by obedience toward individuals or metaphysical entities, which both lead to depression of initiative and servility of mind."

Kropotkin is failing to unequivocally assert whether or not authority and coercion will operate as social processes. Much in the tone of his writing suggests that he is envisaging their disappearance, but then what is to be made of the groups for "mutual protection" and "defence of the territory", which are listed among the "groups and federations of all sizes and degrees , . . for all possible purposes"? Such groups are needed against internal and external enemies who presumably seek to determine the "ever-changing adjustment and readjustment of equilibrium" by systematic violence and deception, after the manner of the conquerors, criminals, etc., with whom history familiarizes us. The believer in a free society is in a dilemma, for the abolition of authority and coercion depends on the renunciation of these processes by all men. That Kropotkin envisaged this is implied by the reference to the freeing of the individual from "fear of punishment" and "obedience towards individuals or metaphysical entities". Taken seriously this would mean an abrogation even of moral authority. But as the social arrangements instituted by the believers in free society are liable to attack, some form of social defence ("mutual protection", "defence of the territory") is necessary, that is, coercion must be resorted to and authority appealed to, in order to maintain the free society.

Such are the problems of believers in free society, but anarchy is compatible with authority and coercion. Perhaps, then, a device would have to be borrowed from the communists and, on the analogy of the withering away of the State in the classless society prepared for by the dictatorship of the prolectariat, anarchy would be conceived of as a transition period between the present and the free society. But to do that would be to make the free society what the classless society of the withered-away State is — *a myth.*

The anarchist doctrine perennially attracts a mixed bag of idealists, intellectuals, crackpots, visionaries, malcontents and individuals drifting on the fringe of law and conventional morality. In rare times and places the doctrine manages to sum up, to convey with a terseness wanting to other doctrines, the hatreds and aspirations of great numbers of men. Then, and only then, with the anarchist beliefs fusing with a mass movement, does the abolition of the State and the institution of anarchy become a possibility.

III

The Sydney libertarian position is sometimes summed up in the slogan, "anarchism, atheism, free love", but this is an anarchism very different from the classical variety. In particular, libertarians reject as illusory the belief that the world as a whole can somehow be reconstructed after an anarchist or libertarian fashion. Instead, empha-

sis is placed on the carrying on of certain activities in the here and now, notably inquiry and free love, without entertainment of the hope that they will be generally accepted or that the world can be made safe for them. Thus libertarians accept, on the one hand, an empiricist and pluralistic philosophy and, on the other hand, an enmity to what are believed to be the forces of authority, as when Ian Bedford declares " an abiding hatred of the State and of all forms of coercion . . . temperamentally unable to stand the police" (*The Red and Black*, No. 1). It is this latter feature which, libertarians believe, establishes continuity between their position and that of the classical anarchists. Thus A. J. Baker refers to "the interest they have in struggling against authoritarian forces and ideas" (*The Sydney Line*, 1963, p. 27), asserting that libertarians "share the anti-authoritarian interests of classical anarchists" (*ibid.*, p. 29).

Now it can be observed that libertarians are taking up activities which can and do exist independently. An empirical, pluralistic logic and social theory do not imply commitment to an anarchist—or what is thought to be an anarchist—position, as can be seen from the example of men whose influence on libertarian theory has been deep, notably John Anderson and Pareto.

It can further be observed that it is only in a special sense that anarchists can be regarded as anti-authoritarian. Confusion can easily arise here because (a) some anarchists have equivocally seemed to oppose all authority and coercion, as we have seen in the specific case of Kropotkin; and (b) anarchists have generally been opposed to what loosely may be termed "the authorities", that is, the police, army, law courts, parliament and so on, and therefore have been anti-authoritarian in the restricted sense of "agin the authorities". But libertarians would want to be anti-authoritarian in a wider way than that. The point here is that it is not easy to oppose unequivocally *all* authority and coercion *and* want the institution of new sets of social arrangements. This is a difficulty which revolutionary reformers cannot evade, as can be seen from critically reading the classical anarchists and other promoters of universal nostrums, for example, Wilhelm Reich (see George Molnar, *Broadsheet*, No. 39). A simple (not to say simple-minded) solution would be to adopt the policy of using authority and coercion to abolish authority and coercion, thus ushering in the free society, but logically this would be no better than the communist policy of class domination (by the proletariat) abolishing class domination. The assumptions underlying such solutions are that authority, coercion and class domination are acceptable if exercised "in the right way" by "the right people", and that aims and policies do not change with changes in the relative social position of their proponents. That at least some anarchists have been alive to the falsity of these assumptions is shown by Michels:

"Nieuwenhuis, the veteran champion of anarchizing socialism with a frankly individualist tendency, showed on one occasion that he had a keen perception of the dangers which anarchism runs from all contact with practical life. At the Amsterdam congress of 1907, after the foundation of the new anarchist international, he raised a warning voice against the arguments of the Italian Errico Malatesta, an anarchist attached to the school of Bakunin. Malatesta, having dilated upon the strength of bourgeois society, declared that nothing would suit this society better than to be faced by unorganized masses of workers, and that for this reason it was essential to counter the powerful organization of the rich by a still more powerful organization of the poor. 'Si tel est ta pensée, cher ami,' said Nieuwenhius to Malatesta, 'tu peux t'en aller tranquillement chez les socialistes. Ils ne disent pas autre chose.' In the course of this first anarchist congress there were manifest, according to Nieuwenhuis, the symptoms of that diplomatic mentality which characterizes all the leaders of authoritarian parties" (*Political Parties,* 1915, pp. 360-61).

If the hope of a general abolition of authority and coercion is rejected as utopian, the question arises of the extent to which authority and coercion can be abolished from the lives of limited groups and their members. Libertarians profess anti-authoritarian interests or preferences, but the precise relation of these to the various activities engaged in by libertarians, whether individually or collectively, is unclear. In this context the complex interplay of social facts must be kept in mind: a group has activities which are participated in, to varying extents, by the group's members and which we may speak of as the characteristic activities of the group, but members have "outside" activities, too, and the outside activities of some members may not be shared by other members. It must also be remembered that "authoritarian", "contra-authoritarian", "anti-authoritarian" and the like are not only terms in a system of social theory, but terms in a system of moral preferences (Cf. "progressive" and "reactionary" in communist terminology). Keeping these points in mind we are in a better position to appreciate some of the obscurities in the libertarian position. Investigation of the obscurities can begin by attending to a type of problem which evidently troubles some libertarians.

Thus Hiatt has suggested that:

". . . it would seem the obvious thing for libertarians to think about playing off the authoritarians against one another. I remember well the uneasiness caused at a libertarian conference some years ago when a certain gentleman asked whether the police would be called in if Frank Browne's boys tried to break up the meeting" (*The Sydney Line,* 1963, p. 122).

The same type of question was raised by R. Poole, reviewing *The Sydney Line* in a student paper:

> "Is, for instance, the action of a householder in refusing admission to a gatecrasher to a party, a display of individual preference, or is he making use of institutionalized property rights?" (*Honi Soit*, 30 June, 1964).

The answer to the reviewer's question would surely be that such action would be both, since only individual preference makes you want to eject gatecrashers and only institutionalized property rights enable you to do so.

But what underlies these questions is the dilemma of the classical anarchists. You say you do not want to use authority and coercion, that in fact you want to abolish them, if not from the world, then from your own life. But in the meantime there are people who do appeal to authority and resort to coercion. Their actions affect you and your friends and the people you sympathize with. Unless mutually satisfactory arrangements can be arrived at with such people (assuming that their demands cannot simply be ignored, as is often the case), you must either submit to their demands, whatever the injury or cost, or resist, which means resorting to coercion or appealing to authority yourself. (Consider the position of the person framed by the police, as with Donald Rooum, whose adventures are described in *Anarchy* 36). But even in the mundane course of everyday life, wants are satisfied by entering into arrangements which exhibit coercive or authoritarian features, which impose restrictions, sanctioned by coercive authority, on the parties. Thus, accommodation is secured by some such means as entering into a landlord-tenant relation (compare the non-authoritarian way, which is to sleep all year round on park benches, on beaches and such places), and a livelihood is earned by some such means as entering into a master-servant relation, taking up crime or setting up in business (compare the non-authoritarian way, which is to beg and scavenge).

If some anarchists and libertarians are puzzled or embarrassed by the question of their relation to obvious facts, then the answer is to be traced to their feeling that it is somehow incumbent upon them to act consistently in a non-authoritarian or anti-authoritarian manner. This is of particular interest in the case of libertarians, since a feature of Anderson's philosophy on which libertarians have drawn is a thorough-going criticism of the notion of obligation (see, for example, Baker, *Libertarian*, No. 1).

But the fact that at least some libertarian behaviour is inexplicable by "anti-authoritarian" interests or preferences cannot be completely ignored. One way in which this discrepancy is accounted for is by invoking the compromises required by the exigencies of life: there is a "hiatus between principle and practice" (*Broadsheet*, No. 20). We can catch an echo here of the ancient view that "the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak". What needs to be stressed is that "practice" and

"flesh" are terms concealing undisclosed principles or preferences. It is an evasion of the issue to disclose some principles only and then to claim that aspects of behaviour inexplicable by the disclosed principles are the result of mysterious forces, such as "practice" and "flesh". Just as one aim of social criticism is to expose the real intersts lurking under cover of ideologies, just as one aim of psychoanalysis is to bring to light repressed motives, so we must look for undisclosed preferences, refusing to be brushed off with partial disclosures, just as we refuse to be satisfied with ideological and neurotic formations.

The question thus becomes: In what circumstances do anti-authoritarian (or any other) preferences operate, what activities give rise to them? The view to be taken here is that such preferences are summary statements of certain conditions required for the continuance of certain activities. Compare Anderson:

> "In considering how there came to be *mores* in a community, we must start from the fact that community is a historical force or set of activities. Now there are relations of support and opposition between any activity whatever and others surrounding it; and likewise we can say that any historical thing has its characteristic ways of working, ways which are variously affected by its historical situation. To say, then, that a society exists is to say that it proceeds along certain lines and that there are conditions favourable and conditions unfavourable to its continuance. Thus, *mores* are, in the first instance, forms of social operation, the engendering of certain states of things and prevention of others. These may be called the demands or requirements of the society. But when the demands come to be formulated by members of the society (and this takes place through conflict among the demands of members), we have *mores* in the second instance — *recognition* of what is required and what is forbidden — we have especially the operation of taboo. So there develop from customary tasks and customary constraints the notions of right and wrong . . . They (the *mores*, K.M.) are simply ways of working of that particularly community in its particular environment . . . Customs, then, ways of social working, must exist if a society is to exist; but they are not to be understood in the 'purposive' fashion, and they raise, of themselves, no question of goodness. Also there is no question of a total social morality; it is seen that there are conflicting demands, conflicting activities, conflicting forms or organization, within the society" (*Studies in Empirical Philosophy*, 1962, pp. 242-43).

Taking this general view, we would expect to find that a group professing anti-authoritarian principles is a group having activities of a kind threatened by authority and coercion. This is the case with libertarians, since their interests include inquiry and "free love". These

activities are hedged and crowded in all societies by authoritarian and coercive restrictions, if not suffering outright repression. They perennially conflict with social groups interested in upholding false or uncritical beliefs or in applying monolithic principles, they perennially excite public animosity. Anti-authoritarian principles are summary statements, formulations, of certain conditions required for the continued existence of activities so threatened. But not all of the activities of a particular group are likely to need defence in this way and, even if they do, not all of the activities of all members of the group would. For that reason it is false and misleading to represent *all* one's activities as conforming to anti-authoritarian requirements, as some libertarians seem to do. To represent one's activities in that manner is to misrepresent them, is to make aspects of one's behaviour inexplicable. It is as if the slogan "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" were taken as a complete guide to American social life, or "liberty, equality, fraternity" to French social life. Such misrepresentations are particular instances of the general phenomenon of ideology (see, for example, Baker, *Libertarian,* No. 2), taking "ideology" in the *original* Marxist sense of "false consciousness".

IV

Inquiry into the social life of a complex society discloses an immense number of social groups, social activities, social interests, an immense diversity in these and a process of change which, at varying rates, all are undergoing. This plurality is recalcitrant to reduction to any monolithic principle (except when the terms of the principle are so vague that they can be made to cover any situation whatsoever), it defies organization by policies derived from any such principle. Acceptance of monolithic principles implies deception, including self-deception, and policies derived from such principles serve to advance particular interests by misrepresenting them as general interests. Deception and misrepresentation are not peculiar, as some believe, to conservative groups; they are features of the activity of radical groups, too.

It is in this complexity that part of the explanation must be sought for the misleading statements groups make about themselves. A group whose activities are threatened with authoritarian restriction or repression, for example, may signify its resolution in such activities by the formulation of anti-authoritarian preferences and, by a process which is familiar, come to believe that this abstract statement of its determination to continue with the threatened activities is applicable to all the activities of the group and its members. But if such anti-authoritarian preferences were deflated in statement, we would get something like this: We are interested in the activity of inquiry (or whatever it is); this activity is of a kind that is perennially threatened by authoritarian restriction or repression; we therefore struggle against authority to the extent that authority endangers our activity.

Now two ways of conducting a struggle are (a) practising the activity, despite the authoritarian threats; and (b) developing a criticism of authoritarian arguments, as such, showing they misrepresent the facts, that they cloak the advancement of special interests and that the appeal to authority is logically fallacious. Both these ways of struggle are applicable when what is threatened is one's inquiries or one's sexual life. The danger is that what is true for certain activities will be mistakenly taken to be true for all activities of the group and its members. Critical scrutiny of libertarian publications suggests that libertarians have shown little sensitivity to this danger, they have been content to generalize from limited aspects of their behaviour to all aspects, thus misrepresenting (expressly or by implication) a part as the whole. This danger is also the rock on which much anarchist writing has been wrecked, with "freedom" being bandied about as if there could be freedom for everyone and everything, when the question is rather one of freedom for what activities of what groups.

Considerations of this sort help to explain the acceptance of the theory, which I believe to be false, of a causal relation between sexual and political repression. This theory, which is discussed at length in the writings of Reich (see, for example, *The Sexual Revolution*), has been taken up by libertarians (and other anarchists), but there is much in it that is obscure. Thus Molnar criticizes certain English anarchists for failure to lay "vigorous insistence on the connection between sexual and political repression" (*Libertarian*, No. 2), but fails to specify the nature of the connection he has in mind. The same failure is present in R. Pinkerton's working out of the theme:

> Politically, the subordination of sexual enjoyment to reproduction and the application of the conception of sin to its independent pursuit, are bound up with the maintenance of the authoritarian state . . . Sexual docility goes along with docility to other kinds of authority and sexual repression may be a condition of social and political servility in general" (*Libertarian*, No. 1).

The writer appears to be making assertions about historical relations between social facts, yet on scrutiny it is had to determine just what he does assert, thanks to the vagueness of "are bound up with" and "may be". Such expressions are resorted to by writers who want to maintain simultaneously that A is B and that A is not B.

In this contest the Nayars are of interest. Their sexual pattern is described by Hiatt:

> "The young Nair girl, before puberty, is married to a nominal husband — a stranger. This marriage remains entirely formal and in three days is terminated by a divorce. The girl can now take as many lovers as she wishes. The lovers contribute to their mistress's support by presents and money, but this establishes no

hold over her. At any time she may dismiss a lover by returning his last gift. The virtue of the system is that it provides the maximum freedom for both men and women, for the lovers were as free as the woman to enter a number of liaisons simultaneously. The arrangement could be broken by either party at any time" (*Broadsheet*, No. 42).

But the Nayars comprise a caste, they are supported from land owned by them but worked by members of an inferior caste, the special occupation of Nayar men is military, and sexual relations outside the caste are, in general, visited with severe penalties if discovered! The sexual freedom this system allows to men and women must, therefore, be admitted to operate within a rigid framework of authoritarian coercion, in whose maintenance the Nayars, because of their military occupation, play an integral part. Thus, among the Nayars and subject to caste limits, sexual enjoyment is not subordinated to reproduction or subjected to conceptions of sin, and docility to the authoritarian caste system manages to exist without sexual docility. It may be added that sexual freedom of the Nayar kind is peculiar to their caste; such freedom is not a feature of the sexual lives of the members of other castes.

Inquiry is another activity whose relations of support and opposition are complex, for, on the one hand, inquiry is perennially liable to authoritarian restriction and, on the other hand, is inextricably associated with institutions whose continued existence requires them to share in wealth which can be accumulated only by authoritarian coercion. The place of institutions of learning and inquiry in a civilization characterized by great disparities of wealth maintained by State authority, was well understood by the classical anarchists. Kropotkin puts the matter succintly into the mouth of a worker:

> "Where then are those young men who have been educated at our expense? whom we have clothed and fed while they studied? for whom, with backs bent under heavy loads and with empty stomachs, we have built these houses, these academies, these museums? for whom, with pallid faces, we have printed those fine books we cannot even read" (*An Appeal to the Young*, 1948 ed., p. 13).

The same passionate sense of injustice drove Malatesta to demand that the intellectual recognize:

> ". . . the debt he has contracted in educating himself and cultivating his intellect which, in most cases, is at the expense of the children of those whose manual work has produced the means" (*Errico Malatesta*: *His Life and Ideas*, 1965, p. 138).

It should be stressed that this recognition did not lead the anarchists into the Marxist error of denying the objectivity of scientific findings. Thus, Malatesta insisted that:

"The truth, science, is neither bourgeois nor proletarian, neither revolutionary nor conservative, and everybody can feel interested in its progress" (*ibid.*, p. 140).

Much academic activity is mindless pedantry, much is vocationally directed, much is at the service of powerful social groups. But granted this, the interdependence of inquiry, taken in the sense of the operations of sceptical and catholic minds, with learning and research, must be insisted on, since the latter supplies the materials for the former. Inquiry cannot even begin to exist without learning and research and, where both are found, they mutually stimulate each other. But, as the anarchist understood, the universities and research institutions depend for their existence on apportionments of the accumulated wealth made possible by the hierarchial and authoritarian organization of society.

Inquiry, then, must be regarded as standing in a parasitic relation to official authority and coercion, but from this the conclusion cannot be drawn that inquiry should emasculate itself by submission to authoritarian demands. An inquirer who did that would cease to be an inquirer. We can put the matter alternatively by asserting that from the fact of interdependence no obligation can be derived. No question of logic or science can be settled by appeal to authority. The ideologies of social groups form part of the subject-matter of inquiry — and hence the attempts such groups make, always have made and always will make, to restrict inquiry.

V

In recognizing the complexity and diversity of social facts, in denying that this complexity and diversity can be co-ordinated according to a monolithic principle, such as Maximization of Pleasure, Resist not Evil, To Each According to his Need, Social Service or the like, we are taking a pluralistic view of society. This pluralistic view contains implications for the criticism of anarchist and libertarian positions. In particular, by directing attention to the plurality of social groups, social activities and social interests, it raises the question of what can be understood by the principles advanced by the adherents of such positions, whether the principles are intended to be extended over society as a whole, as in the case of the classical anarchists, or to operate only in the lives of "the happy few", as in the case of the Sydney libertarians. Thus, it is asserted by and about the anarchists that they "stand for" freedom, that they are the party of freedom. It is asserted by and about the libertarians that they are anti-authoritarian, that they have anti-authoritarian interests and preferences, that they oppose authority ("permanent opposition", "permanent protest").

Now it is evident that these are misleading statements of aim or activity. The "freedom" that anarchists aim at calls for the restriction or repression of many social groups, activities and interests, which are to disappear so that "freedom" can triumph. But what is realistic in anarchist policies is not the abolition of authority and coercion, since these will evidently be operative during the period of restriction and repression, but the abolition of the State, at least in certain historical circumstances, of a rare and probably non-recurrent type (Spain during the 1930s, the Ukraine in the early post-Revolution years). Authority and coercion are independent of the State and, empirically, there is no evidence that they are increased or decreased by the presence or absence of the State. The State is simply a particular social form through which they operate at some times and places. From this it follows that, although abolition of authority and coercion would entail abolition of the State, abolition of the State would not entail abolition of authority and coercion. Anarchy, then, must be distinguished from free society: critical scrutiny of anarchist texts reveals that the anarchists have been equivocal on what they were aiming at.

"The "anti-authoritarianism" of libertarians is partial or selective, since, in fact, libertarians enter into situations exhibiting features which are authoritarian or coercive or both (landlord-tenant relations, master-servant relations, and so on). But the principles on which the selection is made are inexplicit. Libertarians make a point of "criticism", including criticism of authority, and it is here that some of the responsibility for confusion is to be located, since there is a tendency to blur the distinction between vulgar and learned usages of the verb "to criticize". In vulgar usage, to be critical of something is to be against that something; in learned usage, this is not the case: in saying that Edmund Wilson has criticized the novels of Henry James we are not saying that he is somehow opposed to, somehow against, the novels. To say, then, that you are critical of authority is to leave obsure the sense in which you are critical, it is to leave a conveniently fuzzy and obscure region in which you can flit to and fro, whether wittingly or unwittingly, between the two usages. The fact that libertarians enter voluntarily into authoritarian arrangements suggests that they are critical in the learned sense only, but as against that many libertarian statements assert, explicitly or by implication, that they are critical in the first sense. This ambiguity is parallel to the anarchist ambiguity as to the notions of anarchy and free society.

Pluralistic conceptions involve the rejection of the notion that there can be monolithic principles in accord with which all activities of all groups can be conducted. "Freedom" is a particular example of such a principle. But the same general view would seem to hold when it is a case of all the activities of a single group and its members. This leads to the rejection of "Anti-Authoritarianism", when understood as such a principle.

To recognize social plurality is to recognize a variety of relations of support and opposition between a variety of activities engaged in by a variety of groups. These relations include restriction and repression by appeal to authority and resort to coercion. It is within this matrix that the meaning of demands for freedom and statements of anti-authoritarian preference is to be sought. Such a demand is a demand for the removal of a restriction or repression; such a statement of preference is a statement of resistance to restriction or repression. Freedom is not, therefore, a minority interest, since any group in respect of any activity may have occasion to demand freedom. But the activity for which freedom is demanded may be restrictive or repressive, as is the case with many political and religious demands. The fact of struggle and conflict between activities precludes any coherent advocacy of freedom for all activities of all groups. In this connection the people interested in certain activities may find themselves in opposition to servile ideologies which purport to draw up a "social balance sheet", showing how all activities can be adjusted to each other, that is, regulated by powerful social groups, in such a way as to further "the interests of all". We can cast the argument in alternative terms, saying that groups have activities, that activities exhibit regularities and require certain conditions for their continuance, and that a part of the regularities and requirements may come to be verbally expressed in rules, demands, preferences and the like which, like all verbal expressions, may be misleading. Anarchist and libertarian activities are not exceptional.

A feature of social life is the tendency of statements of demands and preferences to assume a life of their own, to swell out into ideologies, and one of the tasks of criticism is to deflate these monstrous growths. Illusions about freedom do not enjoy a privileged status, they are not above criticism.

THE I.W.W. IN AMERICA

By D. Clark

PART I: STRIKE TACTICS

The Industrial Workers of the World looked upon strikes as a means of preparing the workers for the eventual general strike which would achieve the expropriation of the employers. The idea of engaging in strikes, or "revolutionary gymnastics", would not only aid the training of the working man, but in the process would promote class-consciousness. Both these were seen as essential if the "co-operative commonwealth" was to become a reality. Bill Haywood, its leader,

and others knew that every outbreak of discontent should be exploited to the fullest extent. The longer the strike and the more publicity it gained, the greater was its utility.

The I.W.W. was never to see a general strike. It did, however, become involved in many "training incidents". These strikes and free-speech fights certainly were the main forces behind its expansion. Its greatest membership boosts were when it was involved in clashes with police and capitalists, or either. From its inception it realised that a general strike was far off. At first it saw organization of the working class under the banner of the "One Big Union" as the most direct means to its goal. At is became evident that this organization could not be achieved, it realized the strike's immediate value as an ideal to inspire the workers. It had great propaganda value, which should be utilized to its fullest extent. Naturally, its view of the strike was not just utilitarian. If the worker could be persuaded to fight for better conditions, then it was willing to give him all the assistance possible.

As it became obvious that the I.W.W.'s appeal was basically to the unskilled and the migratory, every outbreak of discontent amongst these people deserved its support. Often agitators from the I.W.W. would be responsible for these outbreaks. More often, however, they were spontaneous. Certainly I.W.W. propaganda helped many workers to make up their minds about striking, convincing them that if they made their demands strong enough and were prepared to stand by them, they could win. Thus the two biggest strikes in its history were the result of, primarily, worker discontent, which was shaped and moulded into a practical form. The conditions causing this discontent did not have to be elaborated by I.W.W. speakers or agitators. Without these conditions the strikes would never have occurred, but without I.W.W. organization, the workers would also have not been capable of expressing their discontent in strike action.

Every strike in which the I.W.W. engaged produced lessons to be learnt. The obstinacy of many I.W.W. leaders prevented these lessons from being as effective as they should have been. From its inception in 1905 up until 1912, the I.W.W. was involved in 31 strikes. These were in many industries ranging from the paper, to the automobile, to the shoe-making industries, and the majority were the result of cuts in wage rates. In one of the first, at Goldfields, Nevada, the miners sealed off the town and instituted an eight-hour day at a minimum wage rate. Federal troops soon put and end to this position. Their intervention was the result of a carefully framed dispute, engineered by the mine-owners, between the Western Federation of Miners and the American Federation of Labor. Thus, dissension between rival striking groups had aided the strike's downfall. Without this dissension, the strikers would have been much more capable of achieving their

goals. No strike up until 1912 achieved the success of the one at Lawrence, Massachusetts, in that year. This strike was to be the peak of the I.W.W.'s existence. It was to make the I.W.W., according to one writer, "the main topic of conversation in the offices, in the meetings of ministerial associations, in most of the papers and at the firesides of the more comfortable citizens".

Out of a total population of 85,000 people, almost half of those of fourteen years and over were employed in the woollen and cotton textiles mills of Lawrence. The great majority were unskilled workers of Italian, Polish, French, Jewish, German, Syrian or British descent. Despite a heavy government tariff protection of the woollen industry, the wages and living standards of the operatives had declined steadily since 1905, and in 1911 the average wage for textile employees, including supervisors and foremen, was about $8.50 for a full week's work.

The four largest mills were owned by the American Woollen Company, and over half of the employees in these mills were girls between the ages of fourteen and eighteen. The hazardous nature of their employment is illustrated in the following: "A considerable number of the girls and boys die within the first two or three years after beginning work . . . the average mill worker's life in Lawrence was over twenty-two years shorter than that of the manufacturer". This same writer, Kornbluh, also pointed out that 36% of the employees of the mills died before the age of twenty-five years.

The immediate cause of the strike was a cut in the employees' wages. The I.W.W. had been organizing among the foreign born in Lawrence since 1907 and had 300 paid-up members, and many more supporters. Female Polish weavers were the first to notice the pay reductions and immediately left their looms, shouting "short pay, short pay". Soon the mill operatives were all out. The strike was such a shock to the town that the general riot alarm was rung from the town hall. The strikers decided at a meeting to seek help from the I.W.W. A member of the Executive Board and a frequent past visitor to Lawrence, Joseph Ettor, was sent and was subsequently elected chairman of the strike committee.

The striking workers demanded a 15% increase in wages and no discrimination against any workers for their activities during the strike. These demands were met by the calling in of the National Guard and numerous militia groups. One New York lawyer suggested after the strike that "the militia should have been instructed to shoot" as "that is the way Napoleon did it".

Samuel Gompers, leader of the American Federation of Labor, quickly denounced the strike and its leaders, calling it "a passing event" as well as a "class conscious industrial revolution"! Others felt that

more than invective was necessary to stop the strike. Fifty employees of a Boston detective agency were called in to masquerade as strikers. They earnt their pay well, smashing windows and assaulting people on the street. Dynamite also began to appear all over the town and the press quickly assigned the guilt to the strikers. The "New York Times" declared: "The strikers display a fiendish lack of humanity which ought to place them beyond the comfort of religion until they have repented". However, soon after, John Breen, a member of the local school board and a son of a former mayor, was arrested for planting twenty-eight sticks of dynamite in three different parts of the town. The official charge he faced was "conspiracy to mar, deface and destroy property". Several sticks of dynamite had been placed next door to the office of the I.W.W. organiser, Joseph Ettor, in an attempt to frame him. Breen had meant to place it in Ettor's office, but had left it at the wrong address and was thus apprehended. He was fined $500, after President Wood of the American Woollen Company had been implicated in the plot. Wood had apparently made a cash payment to Breen, but would not explain to the court why. Breen remained a school director and his crime was almost condoned by the entire town. The "Outlook" summed up the whole affair in the following: "Two things are perfectly plain — first, in this strike there was an attempt to discredit the strikers . . . second, it was made clear that large sums of money were paid by the mill-owners without an accounting to show for what purposes they were spent".

As this attempt had failed to stop the strike, another approach was tried, facilitated by the murder of a woman striker by police, which had occurred when they had tried to break a picket line. I.W.W. leaders, Ettor and Giovannitti, were, at the time of the murder, addressing a meeting three miles away. Nevertheless, they were arrested on a charge of conspiracy to murder. The logic of the charge was that as they had told the strikers to picket on previous occasions, they were therefore conspirators to the murder. They were to spend eight months in gaol, after having been refused bail, before there was any attempt to try them.

This tactic failed also. The I.W.W. sent Haywood, Elizabeth Flynn and William Trautmann to take their place. Upon their arrival, martial law was declared in the town and twenty-two more companies of militia were called into the battle. A fifteen-year-old Syrian boy died from a bayonet wound in the back, inflicted by a militiaman. The commander of the militia ordered his men to "shoot to kill. We are not looking for peace now". This order may have been justified if any non-strikers had been killed, but none had. The arrest of Ettor and Giovannitti only inspired the workers to more determined resistance to any form of opposition.

Neither New England nor America had seen such a strike before. The strikers had a spirit which amazed all commentators. Mary Heaton Vorse said: "It was the spirit of the workers that was dangerous. They were always marching and singing". The workers had found in the struggle a great release from the monotony of the mills and to them the class struggle was a real thing as they were, at last, taking part in it. Haywood and other I.W.W. leaders had created confidence in the strikers as to their own ability to challenge their autocratic employers. When Haywood had arrived, 15,000 strikers had met him at the station and cheered him into town. At his first meeting, the different national groups took turn in singing the "Internationale" in their own tongue to him. The I.W.W. propaganda was there in great quantities. Perhaps it was the little red songbook of "songs to fan the flames of discontent" which did most to keep the spirit of the strikers alive. This psychological effect on the strikers of, for example, "The Internationale" was surely great:

"Arise, ye prisoners of starvation!
Arise, ye wretched of the earth,
For justice thunders condemnation,
A better world's in birth.
. . . The earth shall rise on new foundations,
We have been naught, we shall be all."

Passive resistance was stressed by the I.W.W. throughout the strike. This was of many forms. One technique was an endless picket line, in chain form, of thousands of strikers who marched through the mill districts wearing white armbands which read, "Don't be a scab". Another was adopted when police had broken up picketing in the business areas of Lawrence. The mill-workers, often in thousands, would move in and out of the stores, not buying anything, and causing the shopkeepers no end of concern. The turning point in the strike came when a group of children, who were being sent out of Lawrence to New York where they could be properly cared for, were attacked and beaten by police who were trying to stop them leaving. Both mothers and children were clubbed and viciously manhandled. Fifteen children were arrested and charged with "growing up without salutary control".

This violation of basic human rights raised indignation from all sections of American society, including the United States Solicitor General. America was now forced to pay attention to the events in Lawrence. Not even two previous murders had been able to do this. Most attention was focused, however, on the I.W.W. and its tactics. A congressional committee was set up to investigate the conditions in Lawrence, after much opposition, especially from Senator Lodge of Massachusetts, who was the father of Henry Cabot Lodge, now well-known in world politics. The committee revealed the causes of the strike to the American people, the conditions under which the workers

lived and worked, and the violence meted upon the strikers by the authorities.

The American Woolen Company, concerned over the public reaction which the report of the committee would bring, conceded to the workers' demands, soon after the committee began its hearings. Wages of the unskilled were raised 25%, increased overtime compensation was promised and no discrimination was to be made by the company against any workers who had participated in the strike. The strikers, through the support of the I.W.W., had achieved all their demands, and returned to work after having been without wages for over ten weeks.

The strike had been hard. Without outside donations of food and clothing it would never have been won. Even though the American Federation of Labor tried to break the strike by "scabbing", Federation locals in Lawrence and elsewhere raised over $11,000 for strike relief. This illustrates the willingness of the American worker at this time to support any battles in which his class was engaged. Gomper's denunciation of the strike didn't prevent the rank-and-file of his movement from aiding the strikers. The Socialist Party also sent $40,000, and relief funds averaged over $1,000 per day throughout the duration of the strike. Soup kitchens were set up to feed the strikers, using food sent from other nearby textile towns, and doctors and dentists volunteered their servies.

The strike had been won, but not by the tactics the I.W.W. had so often advocated. The I.W.W. slogan, "No compromise with employers nor with wage-slavery", had been ignored. The I.W.W. had engaged in some opportunist give and take, something which was against its strictest principles. The Strike Committee had held counsel with the officials of the American Woolen Company. The leaders had clearly substituted a degree of cautious calculation for more impulsive action. Thus, the I.W.W. had met conflict with rational and carefully deliberated action.

Many speakers had declared: "There shall be no compromise with the wage system, because it is robbery". In the high flights of agitation their demands had been sweeping and promises were made without thought. But when they saw the battle could be won in Lawrence, they resorted to plain opportunism. They had taken what they could get. In many respects the I.W.W. had acted like an ordinary conservative trade union. One writer, Weyl, saw the I.W.W. as just another trade union and not a revolutionary economic organisation of the proletariat. The strikers saw it much differently. They firmly believed that they were about to enter a new era of brotherhood, "in which there would be no more union of trades and no more departmental distinctions, but all workers would become the real bosses in the mills".

Certainly Haywood and others had propagated the idea of the general strike throughout the strike. In the first speech on his arrival he called on the workers to "tie up the railroads, put the city in darkness and starve the soldiers out". This was, of course, impossible without the support of all the workers, including craftsmen organised under the American Federation of Labor. It thus became obvious to the I.W.W. that it must have all sections of the working class organised under its banner if it were ever to tie up the industries of the country and overthrow the capitalist. True to form, and with a total membership at the time throughout the country of only 18,300, the General Executive Board called for a boycott of Lawrence. The I.W.W. newspaper, "Industrial Worker", announced: "Boycott Lawrence . . . Railroadmen: Lose their cars for them! . . . Expressmen: Lose their packages for them! Boycott Lawrence! Boycott it to the limit! . . ."

After the strike, little introspection was carried out by the I.W.W. leaders. They were overjoyed by the fact that they had won, even if they had partly had to compromise their principles to do it. The secretary, St. John, is said to have written to Haywood: "A win in the Lawrence mills means the start that will only end with the downfall of the wage system". However one looks at Lawrence, it was not an ordinary strike. Sheer force of soliditary of the workers had coerced the mill-owners into granting their demands. More important were the slogans and speeches which introduced to the American public, ideas that to them were completely "un-American". A contemporary historian described the strike as a revolution in parvo. Certainly, the I.W.W. had moulded a heterogeneous mass of nationalities into one group, and given them the spirit of the class struggle, something which had appeared impossible. In this respect then the ideology of the I.W.W. was practical, as it enabled class solidarity to be achieved. Its continual exposition of the workers as "wage slaves" and the mill-owners as millionaries who did not deserve their salaries and profit proved effective.

Lawrence put the ideology of the I.W.W. into the press and the public eye. This ideology made Socialism appear quite respectable. It denied the employers' ownership of their property. More alarming to the bourgeoisie was the way the I.W.W. abjured their current ethics and morality. The I.W.W. declared that the sanctions of conduct were founded on the material interests of the proletariat and not on bourgeois norms. The I.W.W. left none of the "sacred" institutions of society alone in its attacks. It preferred a broad type of humanism to the supernaturalism expounded by the churches. The church, obedient to the dictates of big business, preached a servile obedience now for the sake of "pie in the sky" when one died.

The I.W.W.'s attitude to organised religion was illustrated in a banner which a group of anarchists paraded through the streets of Lawrence:

"Arise!!! Slaves of the World!!!
No God! No Master!
One for all and all for one!"

This banner was immediately countered by a "God and Country" campaign, organised as a pretext to drive the I.W.W. out of Lawrence and thus break the strike. Businessmen and other leading citizens began urging people to wear miniature American flags in their buttonholes as proof of their patriotic opposition to the I.W.W. A parade was arranged in order to build patriotic fervour and a banner was displayed, declaring:

"For God and Country!
The Stars and Stripes forever!
The red flag never!"

The I.W.W. ideology displayed by the Lawrence strike met immediate reaction from groups all over the country as well as those in Lawrence. The liberal magazine, "Survey", saw the I.W.W. as a potential threat to the status quo and branded it as a revolutionary body. "Are we to expect that instead of playing the game respectably, or else frankly breaking out into lawless riot . . . the labourers are to listen to a subtle anarchistic philosophy which challenges the fundamental idea of law and order, inculcating such strange doctrines as those of 'direct action', 'sabotage', 'syndicalism', the 'general strike' and violence? . . . We think that our whole current morality as to the sacredness of property and even of life is involved in it."

Lawrence was the test of the I.W.W.'s "Western radicalism" and it came through with flying colours. The liberal, Walter Weyl, visited Lawrence in the early days of the strike and left convinced that there was "nothing to it" as he felt the strike could be won "by a man like Mitchell", but would be lost by Haywood and Ettor. His attitude toward the I.W.W. leadership of the strike was one of sympathetic scepticism. He dismissed the I.W.W.'s aim of worker-controlled industries as an impossible ideal and saw Haywood's Utopia as one of "too generous a faith". In March, however, he returned to Lawrence where the strikers had held out much longer than he expected. All the violence and misery he had foreseen had occurred, but the strikers were still rallied around the red banner of the I.W.W. This time he could not so easily dismiss what he saw. "My experience at Lawrence shook me up mightily," he noted upon his return. "I feel that it compels me to test all my theories."

These were the comments of one of the philosophers of progressivism. His experiences at Lawrence were to lead to his abandonment of progressivism and of his hope for middle-class reform ever

leading to the "Industrial Democracy" he so desired. The I.W.W. in Lawrence, in winning one of the most famous strikes in American history, had proven its abilities to better the conditions of the working class, not by purely syndicalist methods, but by a certain proportion of opportunist give and take and discussions with employers. It provided a clear indication that the workers' "bread and butter" demands were stronger than demands for the general strike. The I.W.W. refused to be led into reformism by this fact, but continued with its die-hard revolutionary tactics for the overthrow of the capitalist.

After the often violent free-speech fights in Fresno and San Diego in 1912, I.W.W. locals began to spread throughout California. Delegates from these locals were sent to organise, on the job, the thousands of migratories in the State. The high concentration of farm ownership, crop intensification and seasonal character of labour utilisation had combined in California to bring about factory conditions of farming with a partly industrialised rural proletariat. This position, to one observer, had "constructed a setting charged with social dynamite". It was the I.W.W. which was to light this "dynamite".

Like any other strike which the I.W.W. participated in, workers' grievances over conditions or wages were well justified. The Wheatland riot was to be the first outburst of American migratory labour in this century which resulted in national publicity. It was also to affect the future of the I.W.W. in California and amongst migratories in general. It occurred on the hop ranch of the largest single employer of labour in the State, near Marysville. The owner, E. B. Durst, had advertised throughout the West for farm hands. By attracting more workers than he could possible use by his exaggerated advertisements, he was able to keep wages down. This, of course, led to much resentment among workers who had often travelled hundreds of miles only to find no jobs available, or the pay very low.

In the 1913 season he employed over 2,700 migratories, the majority of whom were foreigners. There were twenty-seven nationalities represented, the majority being Mexican, Chinese, Puerto Rican, Cuban and Italian. They were paid on a piece-rate system, ranging from ninety cents to one and a half dollars per day. There was much resentment of these wages, but most of the discontent was over the facilities provided for the workers. A few tents and wooden shanties were the only accommodation available, described by Ralph Chaplin, the wobbly poet, as "a temporary shantytown that beggared description". According to Bill Haywood, forty-five men, women and children slept "packed together on a single pile of straw".

Sanitary conditions were even worse than the shelter. Eight makeshift toilets were provided for the 2,700 workers and were located in a

lane of garbage and manure dumps. The men, women and children all started work at four a.m. and often worked in temperatures up to 105 degrees. No water was provided for the workers in the fields. However, a cousin of the Dursts sold lemonade made from citric acid at five cents a glass, the nearest water being over a mile away. Stores in nearby towns were forbidden to send delivery trucks into the ranch and the hop-pickers were forced to buy their food and supplies at Durst's store on the ranch. Durst also withheld ten cents of the workers' pay for every hundred pounds of hops picked as a "premium". This was to be paid at the end of the season to those who had managed to remain on the job for the whole season.

A mass meeting was organised by two "wobblies", "Blackie" Ford and Herman Suhr, which demanded that separate toilets for men and women be provided, that water be provided on the fields, and that the piece-rate wages be increased. Durst was at the meeting and, upon hearing the demands, slapped Ford. Durst then demanded that Ford be arrested by a local constable whom he had conveniently brought with him. The workers stopped the arrest, as the constable had no warrant. The next day, the "wobblies" rented a public piece of land and held a meeting. As Ford was holding up a baby to the meeting and declaring, "It is these children we want to save", two carloads of deputy sheriffs with the district-attorney drove up to arrest him.

To "sober the crowd", a deputy fired a shot towards the meeting. It was apparently mistaken as an attempt to shoot a worker and in the mêlée that followed, a Puerto Rican worker and a young English boy were killed, along with a deputy sheriff and the district attorney. Many of the workers were also seriously injured. Most of the workers then fled from the ranch. The Governor of California then despatched five companies of the National Guard to the area, to "overawe any labour demonstrations and protect private property". Burns detectives arrested hundreds of suspects throughout California and neighbouring States. Many suspects were severely beaten and kept incommunicado for several weeks. One I.W.W. prisoner committed suicide, while another went insane from police brutality. A Burns detective was later convicted of assualt on a suspect and given twelve months' imprisonment.

Ford and Suhr were arrested and charged with murder, although neither owned a gun. They were convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment on the grounds that they were responsible for the meeting which had resulted in the death of the strikers and the authorities. I.W.W. newspapers were incensed with the convictions. They pointed out that, but for the actions of Durst, the killings would never have occurred. Migratories were urged everywhere to support a campaign to free Ford and Suhr in an issue of "Solidarity" devoted entirely to the incident.

The widespread fear and hatred of the I.W.W. was balanced somewhat by active sympathy for Ford and Suhr and the movement they represented. As a result of the riot, a Commission of Immigration and Housing was set up which investigated the Durst ranch and found that housing conditions on the ranch were "unspeakably bad" and that the conditions on the ranch were by no means exceptional.

In the year following the riot, forty new I.W.W. locals were started in California and, by the end of 1914, over one hundred volunteer soap-boxers agitated throughout the State. California was blanketed with stickers and circulars urging a boycott of the hop fields until Ford and Suhr were released and living and working conditions improved. Members were urged to practice go-slow tactics as a form of sabotage, and the employers immediately charged that the I.W.W. was advocating destruction of machinery and property. "Gurley" Flynn's sabotage pamphlet was widely distributed and the black cat emblem for sabotage began to be seen all over California. Other I.W.W. literature urged the workers not to engage in any malicious damage of property, and the I.W.W.'s opponents saw this as in fact urging the workers to carry out the acts the I.W.W. had advised them not to. This insistence on exaggerating the I.W.W.'s aims and even misconstruing them was to aid the employers in eventually having it declared illegal.

The I.W.W. aimed at hitting the employer where it hurt him the most. "It is no use appealing to the master's sense of justice for he has not got any, the only thing left is action on the pocketbook". Certainly the I.W.W. had seen that this was, in fact, the case, with the experience it gained not only from the Wheatland riot, but from the numerous free-speech fights it had engaged in. By the end of 1914, the boycott of the hop fields, the I.W.W. claimed, had left the hop crop 24,000 bales short, and after three years it estimated that the boycott had cost the farmers ten million dollars a year. The farmers themselves claimed, however, that the three-year boycott had cost them between $15 to $20 million. Whatever the exact figure, the I.W.W.'s campaign to free Ford and Suhr had been costly to the employers. However, the general strike called for on numerous occasions never eventuated. Ranch owners began recruiting their own private police forces composed of gunmen and detectives to eliminate the I.W.W. and these forces were to cost them an average of $10,000 per year.

Ford was eventually released in 1925, but was re-arrested as he left the prison, on another murder charge. A year later, after his acquittal, he was finally freed. Suhr was also released soon after. Both had paid the penalty for organising the revolt against the conditions on the Durst ranch. The whole affair, although strengthening opposition to the I.W.W., had awakened the public to the conditions of the migratory. Even the most staid sources came out in opposition to employers like Durst: "Great employers like Durst who shriek the loudest against the

I.W.W. are the very ones whose absolute disregard of the rights of others, and whose oppressions and inhumanities are more potent crusaders to swell the ranks of the I.W.W. than its most violent propagandists". Thus said a newspaper which was to lead the fight against the I.W.W. a year or so hence.

The Wheatland episode had created a precedent in agricultural America. Farmers had learned the meaning of strikes for better wages and working conditions and responded with tactics such as driving agitators and workers from towns at the point of guns and vigilante committees. To one academic, class warfare had broken out, "in the most 'American' sections of rural America". This class warfare was to be allowed a short life span. Because of what an I.W.W. soap-boxer had once said, or what an I.W.W. newspaper had hinted at, the I.W.W. was to be viciously crushed. One didn't need evidence that sabotage had occurred to accuse the I.W.W. of indulging in it. The mere fact that it had been suggested was sufficient. The opponents of the I.W.W., especially the newspapers, were to espouse more ultra-radical propaganda than the I.W.W. ever did, in their constant attacks on the organisation.

Unfortunately, it was an organisation which was revolutionary in character that had exposed what was "hidden in the cupboard" of industrial America. If an organisation of a more conservative nature had done this on any scale, then suppression of the facts would have been much more difficult. However, the I.W.W., with its anti-religious and anti-militarist ideology, had been responsible, and on these grounds it could be easily crushed, thus removing any need to eliminate the conditions on which it had thrived and grown.

"DILEMMAS OF A FILMNIK"

By J. Flaus

In discussion, I frequently find myself being forced into a defence of my "addiction" to certain art forms — an attitude which can sometimes seem opposed to my social values.

I should not have to justify my interest in art — though even this is occasionally called into question. We should all be agreed that art provides a peculiar quality of satisfaction; that it is a good thing in itself and its goodness is not diminished by being shared. It may not take priority over food, shelter or health, but it need not be a hothouse novelty. To me it is a robust, demanding activity.

Whilst I do distinguish between beauty (object and beholder), and art (creator and object), and recognise that many beautiful objects are non-artistic, it is sufficient for the points I am going to make to use the terms "art", "artistic", etc., throughout, and sometimes in place of "film", which is the art form that preoccupies me; "artistic activity" here will cover both creative and appreciative participation.

Art is prized for its individual qualities, but only in as much as these enrich a community. In this respect, art supplies a pattern for living. If the "art of living" means anything to me, it means the continuous cultivation of individuality — not in isolation which would make individuality meaningless, but within a social context of voluntary co-operation.

Art threatens to be disruptive of standardisation, and as such has been feared by supporters of order-with-law from Plato onwards.

It is easy but inadequate to claim that the artistic function must be anarchistic in some way, since whatever the artist is doing — expressing, communicating, asserting (is there a difference?) — he is exercising individuality of purpose, standard, and achievement; moreover, if the percipient is to respond fully, he must become aware of and admit a similar framework of values, with an accompanying alertness of perception and sympathy.

Sounds ideal, which it is, but it is not essential. One can be an artist without originality or dependence. How many artists are masters of themselves, or even seek to be, except in a self-delusive way warring against minor restrictions?

In the community of the wary, the servile, and the corrupt, a widespread atrophy of sensitivity sets in. There is a displacement from emotional engagement, to sensuous diversion. Claims for attention and acceptance resort increasingly to excess of shrillness, shock, massivity, pretension. We can see the signs around us.

Our established artist can live in a drugged circle of supply-demand, success-prestige, and never cross the ring. Imagination becomes a tool of social ambition, achievement is marketable, standards are set by the consumer.

The absence of servility is no guarantee of an opposition to authoritarian practice in general. Many anti-establishment protests embodied in artistic vehicles seem to me the sentiments of those who resent this form of authority, but would have another. Many members of our culture have received an upbringing which was not severely disciplined, but in which the principle of authority was never questioned. Where authority was invested in benign figures who were also reposi-

tories of affection, comfort, protection, etc., it could have developed into a perpetual need in association with personal attention. The impersonal exercise of authority by the State might then be vaguely experienced as a cheat and become a constant source of ill-defined resentment. I suspect a great number of social protests have this sort of motivation.

The answer is not to evaluate films by purity of motive or degrees of innovation. The former may be irrelevant, the latter may be inhibitory. I find myself embarrassed in discussion when friends are dismayed by my attitude in attacking or shrugging off a film which they praise because it shows anger at authoritarian society, or compassion for its repressed and deluded casualties.

Not enough, I say, I can give only qualified praise, even if the arguments strike home clearly. The reply comes: What's so bloody special about your film art then, that it can be held important enough to take the knock on *Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner*, with all its demonstrable lessons?

Well, have I really retreated into a sort of Specialists' encystment from the world when I accept *Paths of Glory* but not *Man in the Middle* or *The Condemned of Altona; Les Amants* but not *The Die is Cast; The Exiles* but not *I, the Aboriginal; Baby, the Rain Must Fall* but not *Long Day's Journey into Night; War Hunt* but not *Bitter Victory* or *The Hook; Station Six Sahara* but not *The Balcony?*

So I find myself making the big defence. It is important to me to make it.

I have to get it fairly clear in my mind what art in any form is going to do for me. I can hardly plead that it is "natural", when there seem to be plenty of people of my acquaintance who can conduct their lives to their own satisfaction without deep or frequent traffic with the arts — people who could not be regarded as inferior or pathological by any standard I should want to hold.

In quite a few places I am groping for acceptable formulations. Knowing what I feel myself may not save me from going under when I lean too heavily upon other people's theories. But the best place to test my intellectual constructions is before the company whose basic values I share. If they are brought down — well, that will show they were not firm enough.

It is not that I value the practice of art more highly than, say, support of principles like permissive training, or guiltless sexuality, or resistance to institutional standardization, but that art is distinguished by its primary concern, not with analysis and judgement of situations, but with their emotional content.

If the emotional content incorporates views of which I approve, then this is by way of a bonus.

Confusion arises particularly in the representational arts that are organized around narrative (which film has no necessity to be — though most films show this sort of development).

If the explicit propositional arguments of the work are going to be its criteria of assessment, they might better be presented in the forum, unencumbered by representational forms. Any emotional quality these express, may greater enthuse the putter of the arguments, but cannot improve the validity of his reasoning.

If the arguments are not incorporated primarily to be attended to as arguments, they need to take their place in the ordering of emotional phases. The presentation of emotional content of situations may very well involve the organization of numerous personal reactions, and these, on reflection, may lead to value judgements. But the order of precedence must be observed if the peculiar quality of the aesthetic experience is to be had.

I would not have much hope that artistic presentation could reshape the opinions of a sophisticated person, but it could reinforce an overall view by an assembly of provocative elements.

So the art in which I am involved is not going to be a shaper of my values, but merely a reinforcer; a source of feelings only, not principles. I do not consider this to be the inferior thing it sounds. If the emotion were not already in existence in some generalised form, the impetus to form, hold and practice these values would not have been generated. Here it is being re-presented, crystallized, contemplated.

"Contemplation" takes on a special meaning. At the risk of getting out of my depth on aesthetic questions, I will use Baensch's assertion that artistic appreciation is a "knowing" process. Science "knows" the ordering of physical events; art "knows" the emotional content of experience. Art aims to be understood, but since what it makes the subject aware of is of an emotive nature, it elicits a reaction of pleasure or displeasure. The emotional reaction is incidental to the cognitive act of coming to "know" an emotion, or complex of emotions.

The emotion is presented *free* from a social context, *free from the need to act*. This is the special contemplation which art affords.

We should already have made our commitments to the social context. The artistic representation should not need to be the occasion of knowing better the context, but of knowing better the emotional qualities residual in the context.

This does not make beliefs irrelevant. Anyone not totally unself-conscious who is concerned with living some part of this life in art must have made a moral decision to begin. Also, representational art works frequently rely for effect upon morally loaded responses. But these are organized in the emotional complex which is the whole; the knowing of this requires a special sort of detachment, a divorce of feeling from its practical implications.

Only by an operation like this can I come to know the emotional content of attitudes which I theoretically fear or despise, like the intoxicating barbarism of *Triumph of the Will,* or that juggernaut of a personal myth which sums the career of John Wayne.

(An Andersonian view of the three traditional mental faculties—cognitive, conative, affective—which regards the emotion as that which does the knowing and the striving, might regard the artistic object as presenting the emotion without the relations of knowing and striving, though with the relations of being known, and being striven for.)

"Detachment" may be conceived in two dimensions — physical or psychological. Consider a factual film of an atrocity, say, the Auschwitz ovens. The reactions it evokes of horror, rage, whatever, may be as strong as those from the same images viewed while physically present. Actually, the reaction there would be not "contemplated", but overlaid and intricated with such practical considerations as "whatever can I do to stop it", "am I going to be a victim, too?", etc.

A continuous factual newsreel, like an instructional demonstration film, or a filmed debate, or the record of the baby's first steps on the lawn, is not art. There is a degree of detachment here, but it applies of necessity because of displacement in time and space. This physically necessary detachment could be reduced, for instance, by the use of closed circuit television. It might still function, for instance, for something as tense as a surgical operation, yet some mishap in front of the camera could conceivably send the viewer off to help in instances of proximity.

In the artistic situation, the aesthetic response needs a sense of detachment from the context of the action independent of practical spatio-temporal factors.

Vivas, in *The Problems of Aesthetics,* puts it this way: "An aesthetic experience is an experience of rapt attention which involves the intransitive apprehension of an object's immanent meanings in their full presentational immediacy".

"Immanent" meanings are qualities directly in the object, and not referential signs "standing for" anything else.

"Intransitive" attention is controlled so that it does not extend to meanings not present immanently in the experienced object.

Vivas found certain generic traits of aesthetic objects — unity in variety, theme emphasis, rhythmic evolution — correspond fairly closely with what psychologists have specified as "factors of advantage" controlling attention — change, strength, striking quality, definite form. He regarded this correspondence as the explanation of the attention-binding ("rapt") nature of the aesthetic experience.

I cannot say this further supports my pre-occupation with art, but it does pass the onus on to those who live well enough without it.

Naturalism has been manifest (in practice or principle) in various art-forms and ages. With extension of the naturalistic criterion to drama's special combination of kinetic and pictorial representational forms, there arises a practical need for assertion of the "intransitive" nature of aesthetic experience.

Ibsen, and the "fourth wall" drama, provoked a theoretical controversy. The naturalistic drama was seen by some as indistinguishable from reality (i.e., as real as, and real-in-the-same-way-as, that which it depicted), and there ensued a great boil-up of theories about art and life and illusion and reality.

However, the reception of popular melodrama was not significantly affected by questions of whether "real" houses, and "real" train-wrecks were on stage, or whether it was "real" water that the Colleen Bawn was drowning in, and this, plus the fact that theatre carried on unparalysed (if not unchanged), suggests that these theories were remote from artistic practice. I see it more as evidence that the majority of theatrical patrons sought primarily "entertainment", and went on happily muddling intrinsic and extrinsic evaluations of drama.

Personally, I am unable to accept the most shrewdly documented dramatic surface of dialogue and decor as naturalistic — much less as interchangeable with reality (i.e., interchangeable with what it purports to be: since, of course, as a human situation striving to be accepted as other than itself, it is part of reality: it *is* a real human situation striving, etc.). The realism-reality division is irrelevant to the nature of the dramatic situation.

Yet it was actively disputed for a generation until 1913 when, in a single essay in *British Journal of Psychology,* Edward Bullough formulated the concept of "physical distance", and settled the controversy. It is now a dead issue for theatrical production.

Allowing Bullough's concept of "physical distance" as a general aesthetic principle (of special importance in the representational arts), I am excited by the emergence of some characteristic forms of cinema — the new art of the technological civilization — which can make, if not a breakthrough, at least a distinct modification.

Even in the Story film, where the action before the camera is contrived, the kinetic and pictorial representational forms are:
(1) more comprehensive than the corresponding forms in drama; and

(2) able to be combined more freely and expressively, and — if need be — more naturally, where any combination of these forms in drama must be cemented by an indispensable literary form.

The factual film bears a crucially different relation to reality from other art forms. The literary dimension is absent from the sort of factual film whereby the film-maker, regardless of his orientation, cannot contrive or impose upon his material a pre-existing scheme, or direction, or developmental rhythm. Examples of this I give later.

My preoccupation is with the possibilities of this distinct, little understood art form which can place the artist (and, in turn, the viewer) in a special relationship to the world, and to the exploration of its emotional content.

When the art work is experienced through a range of sensitivity similar to that which we bring to our everyday lives, the resultant emotional content is likely to develop along lines of inference and replication similar to those which operate in the flux of living. Our judgements and attitudes are "lived out" *without the mediation of aesthetic conventions.*

LENIN AND WORKERS' CONTROL
(PART 2)
THE KISS OF DEATH

By T. Brown

Late in 1917 the Russian provisional government was confused, weak and ready to fall. Peasants, wage workers, soldiers and sailors, growing stronger in their soviets, were moving in half awakening to take over the direction of the country. Lenin saw his opportunity.

The peasants were winning their battle for the land, so the Bolsheviks suddenly switched their land policy and, in the face of a successful revolution, cried with the Anarchists and Social Revolutionaries, "The land to the peasants!" Lenin wrote his *State and Revolution,* which looked like an approach to Anarchism and a rebuff to Marxists, and an alliance with the Left Social Revolutionaries was made.

On November 7 the rising against the Kerensky Government was made in Petrograd, the attack on the Winter Palace being led by a Russian Anarchist, Bill Shatov, returned home from America. The sailors of Kronstadt, "the flower of the 'October Revolution' ", were given pride of place in the battle. Success followed in Moscow. Under Lenin a new government was formed, some seats being given to the Left S.R.'s and to smaller groups, such as Maxim Gorki's Novaya

Zhizn. However, the Bolsheviks held the post of physical power, they were the commissars who controlled the army, the police and the jails; the S.R.'s and Gorki got the portfolios of education and such. Revolutionaries in Russia then seemed to trust one another a great deal. Certainly the non-Bolsheviks never intended a one-party dictatorship. They were soon to learn, as others are still learning, that an alliance with the Communists is the kiss of death.

On November 18 the Peasant Congress met in the Duma. The Bolsheviks had tried hard to gain a majority, but could command only 20 per cent. of the delegates, the Left S.R.'s having a big majority and beloved Maria Spiridonova in the chair. The delegates expressed the self-confidence of the delegates in their handling of the land question.

Reserved for the State

Isvestia of November 10, 1917, published Lenin's Land Decree seemingly giving to the peasants the land they already possessed, but, in fact, limiting the land they might take. "It was the intention of the Bolsheviks, however, that a considerable portion of the estate lands should not be subject to distribution, but be retained as model State farms; and the annex to the decree referred explicitly to 'Territories where cultivation is of a high order: gardens, plantations, nurseries for plants and trees, orchards, etc.', as 'not subject to division', but as reserved for 'the exclusive use of the State or district as model institutions'; and similarly 'studs, State and private cattle breeding establishments, poultry farms'."

M. H. Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development since 1917*

Dobb goes on to say that peasant pressure curtailed the plan, for example, only between two and three million acres of sugar beet estates were left to the State, instead of 10 to 12 million. The land possessed by the peasants increased from 70 per cent. of all cultivated areas to 96 per cent. In the Ukraine the increase was from 56 to 96 per cent. and the land workers were in almost complete control of agricultural production.

Lenin at the same time tried to stop the take-over of industry, his "Decree on Workers' Control" came on November 14, 1917. Here we must be careful, the decree was not written in English and translation of political terms is often faulty and influenced by the political consciousness of the translator. The Russian words used in the decree do not mean the same thing that is meant by "Workers' Control" in the English-speaking world. Dobb comes halfway to admitting this, "In fact, the very word that is usually rendered into English as 'control' has in Soviet usage a meaning that goes at least halfway towards what in England would be referred to as 'supervision' and might at any rate

be not inappropriately rendered as 'steering' " (Ibid). The works committees were intended to be something that we would now recognise as ancestors of the Joint Production Committees organised by the British Communist Party and the Engineering Employers' Federation in the late war.

Bolshevism somehow acquired the reputation of being "Socialism, but in a hurry". Dobb denies that it was so and, ascribing the myth to such writers as R. W. Postgate (*Bolshevik Theory*) and Norman Angell, goes on to say, "But the placing of Socialism on the immediate agenda was explicitly disclaimed. Clause 8 of the April Theses clearly affirmed: 'Not the "introduction of Socialism" as an immediate task, but to bring immediately social production and distribution of goods under the *control* of the Soviet' " (Ibid, p. 68). That is, State control. With a fatalism worthy of Marxist determinism, Lenin's party was moving, not to collectivism, but to the extension and intensification of the Tsarist centralised State. It was the workers who were driving towards collectivism.

The 'bourgeois' example

"The 'amalgamation of all banks into a single national bank, control over which should be exercised by the Soviet', and national control of syndicates and cartels were called for, but only as 'measures which do not in any way imply the "introduction of socialism" and which have been frequently undertaken during the war by a number of bourgeois States', which are 'entirely feasible economically' " (Ibid, p. 68).

"Later writing on the eve of the November revolution on *The Threatening Catastrophe and How to Avert it*, he spoke of the nationalisation of the oil industry and of the coal industry as necessary 'to increase the production of fuel' and to combat 'the stopping of production by the industrialists'; the complete syndication of industry under State control — a measure which 'has already been put into practice in Germany' and does not directly, in itself, infringe upon the relations of private property to any degree" (Ibid, p. 69, also Lenin, *Collected Works*, XXI, book 1).

"Compulsory syndication under the control of the State, this is what Capitalism has prepared the way for and what the Junker State has put into effect in Germany; this is what will be completely realised in Russia by the Soviets" (Lenin, *Will the Bolsheviks Maintain State Power*, pp. 52-53).

"But no sweeping measures of confiscation or nationalisation were immediately proposed. Rather was it a controlled or directed capitalism, steered by such measures of economic control as had come to be the common stock-in-trade of belligerent governments that was contemplated" (Dobbs, *S.ED.S. 1917*, p. 83).

Lenin spoke of the State power adapting itself to the existing conditions "as gradually as possible and breaking with as little of the old as possible" (Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. IX, p. 284).

(To be continued.)

WHY WE ARE NOT ANARCHISTS

"During this same period (early 20th century), we met with a great deal of criticism . . . In one of the northern colonies . . . lived an exile called Makhaisky, whose name soon became generally known. Makhaisky began as a critic of social democratic opportunism. His first hectographed essay, devoted to an exposure of the opportunism of the German social democracy, had a great vogue among the exiles. His second essay criticized the economic system of Marx and ended with the amazing conclusion that socialism is a social order based on the exploitation of the workers by a professional intelligentsia. The third essay advocated the rejection of political struggle, in the spirit of anarchist syndicalism. For several months, the work of Makhaisky held first place in the interest of the Lena exiles. It gave me a powerful inoculation against anarchism, a theory very sweeping in its verbal negations, but lifeless and cowardly in its practical conclusions."

Leon Trotsky, *My Life*, 1930.

The Editorial Tribunal.

Dear Sirs,

One of the late A. Hitler's gifts to posterity seems to be that it is now almost impossible to talk sensibly and objectively about racial differences.

Mr. J. Grancharoff's article in Red and Black, No. 1, continues the confusion, and does a disservice to free and open discussion.

Two things always puzzle me in this context: Firstly, why do racists spout twisted nonsense to support their arguments when there is respectable evidence that the races of the human species differ in their abilities?

Secondly, why do anti-racists get into the argument about differences at all (often spouting twisted nonsense when there is respectable evidence for equality)?

The facts of racial variation have no bearing on anti-racism because they are not central to racism. A man is not a racist because he believes in racial differences. He is not one even because he inflates the evidence to suit his case, and only partly because he construes "different" as "inferior".

Racism consists in the choice to ill-treat a man on the strength of a decision as to his capacity. It is the ill-treatment which matters, not the subterfuge for its employment.

The only answer to racism is that cruelty is never justifiable, and that the degree of its absence is the measure of civilisation.

Ken Miller,

Ryde, N.S.W.

OTHER PERIODICALS

English

Anarchy, monthly magazine.

Freedom, the anarchist weekly paper.

Both available from *Freedom Press*, 17a Maxwell Road, London, S.W.6.

Direct Action—monthly paper of the syndicalist workers federation, 34 Cumberland Road, London, E.17.

Minus One—an individualist anarchist review.
S. E. Parker, 2 Orsett Terrace, London, W.2.

Solidarity—a subversive rank and file monthly journal.
Bob Potter, 197 Kings Cross Road, London, W.C.1.

American

Views and Comments—Quarterly journal of the Libertarian League.
P.O. Box 261, Cooper Station, New York, N.Y., 10003.

The Rebel Worker—journal of the Chicago branch of the I.W.W., 713 Armitage Avenue, Chicago 14, Illinois, 60164.

Industrial Worker—(I.W.W.)
2422 Halsted Street, Chicago, Ill., 60614.

L'Adunata dei Refrattari—an anarchist fortnightly paper in Italian.
P.O. Box 316, Cooper Station, New York, N.Y., 10003.

Tierra y Libertad—in Spanish.
Domingo Rojas, Apartado Postal M-10596, Mexico 1, D.F.

Italian

Uminata Nova—an anarchist weekly newspaper.
Via Dei Taurini, 27, Rome.

Volonta—an anarchist monthly magazine.
Aurelio Chessa, Via Dino Col 5—7a Genova, Italy.

French

Noir et Ruge—an anarcho-communist magazine.
Legant, B.P. 113, Paris 18. (Do not mention "Noir et Rouge".)

Le Monde Libertaire—Organe de la Federation Anarchiste.
3, rue Ternaux, Paris (11).

International Centre for Research into Anarchism (C.I.R.A.).
Beaumont 24, Lausanne-CH., Switzerland.

Australian

Broadsheet—published by the Libertarian Society at Sydney University.
Box 3015, G.P.O., Sydney, N.S.W.